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CASTE AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS: 
FROM JIM CROW TO SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGES 
Richard A. Epstein* 
The battle over civil rights law has been waged on many differ-
ent fronts at the same time. Historically, the emphasis has been on 
the manifest injustices that dominant groups have inflicted on other 
groups with less political power. Economically, the dispute has 
been over whether civil rights legislation will increase or reduce 
overall levels of production. Sociologically, the question has been 
whether civil rights legislation can overcome hierarchy and foster a 
sense of community among equals, or whether it increases levels of 
group consciousness,· which in turn leads to issues of group 
separation. 
In most modern settings, this search for rationales has not 
stemmed from any doubt about the wisdom or even the necessity of 
civil rights laws. Quite the opposite, the desirability of these laws is 
usually taken for granted, and the inquiry then proceeds with the 
aim of finding the most powerful intellectual base on which these 
laws can rest. But the evident increase in racial and ethnic conflict 
and the massive attention to sex differences or gender relations -
even the terms used in the debate will say a lot about which side an 
advocate is on1 - show that the old confidence about the desirabil-
ity of these laws has been shaken by an ever-increasing awareness 
that things have not turned out quite the way the supporters of civil 
rights legislation had hoped. 
That sense of disappointment is evident in the disagreement 
over fundamental objectives. On the one hand, commentators 
commonly proclaim that the purpose of civil rights legislation is to 
make institutions and individuals ignore those differences of race 
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago. 
A.B. 1964, Columbia; B.A. 1966, Oxford; LL.B. 1968, Yale. - Ed. I should like to thank 
Elena Kagan and Michael McConnell for their immensely helpful (because critical) com· 
ments on an earlier version of this essay, and Isaac Barchas for his usual splendid research 
assistance. 
1. For a recent overview, see Alan Wolfe, The Gender Question, NEW REPUBLIC, June 6, 
1994, at 27 (reviewing SANDRA L. BEM, THE LENSES OF GENDER: TRANSFORMING THE 
DEBATE ON SEXUAL INEQUALITY (1993), HELEN w. HASTE, THE SEXUAL METAPHOR 
(1994), and JUDITH LORBER, PARADOXES OF GENDER (1994)). 
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and sex that are morally irrelevant from a proper point of view.2 
That line of argument works well when the question is whether 
someone from a privileged class - usually, but not always, a white 
male - should be allowed to indulge a "taste" for discrimination 
against individuals who fall outside that preferred group. But the 
language of moral irrelevance quickly disappears from view when 
the question is whether affirmative action programs should redress 
grievances against particular groups, or whether considerations of 
diversity should permit - or require - institutions to take into 
account matters of race or sex in order to obtain the proper internal 
institutional balance,3 independent of whether the individuals in-
volved have been the targets of past discrimination. These two con-
ceptions clash in uncomfortable ways and have led to a certain 
amount of bobbing and weaving in an effort to justify state-imposed 
preferences that to the undiscerning eye may look like forms of re-
verse discrimination, all for motives that could vary from lofty to 
suspect, depending on the interlocutor's point of view. 
The utter ambivalence over the nature and justification of civil 
rights laws is not easily remedied, and perhaps we should not even 
try to supply the needed rationalizations. I have stated as openly, 
forcefully, and frequently as I can: these laws should be repealed as 
quickly as possible to the extent that they regulate the behavior of 
private parties in competitive employment markets, and indeed in 
other competitive markets, such as education and housing.4 The 
point of this argument is that open markets can allow separate and 
distinct institutions to forge their own policies on discrimination. 
Burning questions of diversity and affirmative action need no 
longer be collective issues, and governments do not have to decide, 
2. The most systematic and thorough application of the caste principle to modem ques-
tions of race and sex discrimination is Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 M1cH. L. 
REV. 2410 (1994) (this issue), which ably presents a defense of the caste principle to which 
this article is in part a response. 
3. Judith Lorber, it appears, argues for "scrupulous gender equality," meaning that 50% 
of the employees in each job category should be male and 50% should be female. See 
LoRBER, supra note 1, at 298; see also Wolfe, supra note 1, at 32. Lorber cares not a 1, at 298; 
see also Wolfe, supra note 1, at 32. Lorber cares not a whit for total output - which will fall 
precipitously - or for individual freedom - which will disappear under the crush of govern-
ment mandates. 
4. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT 
D1scRIMINATION LAws (1992). For subsequent elaborations, see Richard A. Epstein, Stand-
ing Firm, on Forbidden Grounds, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (1994) [hereinafter Epstein. 
Standing Firm] (answering my many critics), and Richard A. Epstein, Why the Status Produc-
tion Sideshow; or Why the Antidiscrimination Laws Are Still a Mistake, 108 HARV. L. REv. 
(forthcoming Mar. 1995) (commenting on Richard McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The 
Economics of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REv. (forth-
coming Mar. 1995)). 
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once and for all, whether they believe in color-blind rules, affirma-
tive action, diversity, or strict proportionality, nor do they have to 
do the mental gymnastics necessary to defend all these positions 
simultaneously. Separate institutions can go their separate ways. 
The overall level of social output should increase without the dan-
gerous side effects and resentments that are brought on by ever 
more intrusive forms of government regulation. More important, 
perhaps, the truly powerful and insidious institutions of caste and 
domination could not survive in a world in which the presumption 
was set against the exercise of state power, the law of contracts en-
forced private bargains, the law of tort controlled private aggres-
sion, and public officials acted in a neutral and impartial fashion 
toward all citizens in the protection of these private rights. 
The usual response, however, has not been to give up on civil 
rights laws but to find ways to imbue them with a new life and vital-
ity. One way to achieve that goal is to create the kind of focus on 
outrages and abuses that lent the movement its great moral power 
in the years before 1964. It is, I think, not quite coincidence that 
public television often replays the clips of Marion Anderson singing 
"My Country 'Tis of Thee" on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial 
and relives the early triumphs of Thurgood Marshall in Brown v. 
Board of Education.5 It is a form of nostalgia that a1lows the reju-
venation of a social fabric grown weary with the travails of Benja-
min Chavis.6 More generally, the effort has been to show that the 
evils of racism and sexism that we face today are, in more subtle 
form, the same evils we have faced in times past. One way to 
achieve that result is to claim that we have today, again in more 
subtle form, the same kind of economic and social "caste" system 
that operated in the Old South during the heyday of Jim Crow. The 
social and legal barriers that are still in place prevent the emer-
gence of the kind of social equality and economic competitiveness 
that would render all forms of civil rights laws unwise and unneces-
sary. Until that equality emerges, some form of government action 
is necessary to redress the injustices of the past and to restructure 
the society of today. 
I think that any effort to portray the current social situation as 
the outgrowth of traditional castelike policies confuses the out-
growth of multiple and uncertain social forces with explicit legal 
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
6. See Ellis Cose & Vern E. Smith, The Fall of Benjamin Chavis, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 29, 
1994, at 27; Steven A. Holmes, After Ouster of Chavis, Uncertainty for N.A.A.C.P., N.Y. 
T1MES, Aug. 28, 1994, § 4, at 2. 
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distinctions. We must be aware of establishing formal distinctions 
between persons, sanctioned and recognized by law - an establish-
ment that helps to perpetuate the same rigid class distinctions that a 
liberal society should seek to obviate. This result is evident in the 
work of radical feminists who want to impose their own vision of a 
just society on those who do not share their own beliefs and convic-
tion. But it is also evident in the work of moderate institutions that 
are not attentive to what those feminists do. 
One illustration will have to suffice. The evolution of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act7 shows how easy it is for castelike notions to creep 
in through the back door of the very law that was designed to expel 
them. The original text is the paragon of neutrality insofar as it 
makes it unlawful for any employer - not all people or all employ-
ees - "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual ... because of such 
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."8 The stud-
ied effort of the section is to use impersonal language that speaks of 
a universal obligation, the antithesis of caste. But in just one un-
thinking decision, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,9 the 
Supreme Court changed the ground rules under the Act from uni-
versal to particularistic when it announced that any individual could 
make out "a prima facie case of racial discrimination ... by showing 
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was 
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; 
(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, 
after his rejection, the position remained open."10 But it is a whop-
ping non sequitur to declare that only members of racial minorities 
can be victims of racial discrimination under the statute, even if 
such individuals are in fact more likely to be the targets of such 
discrimination. The casual way in which the Supreme Court im-
posed formal restrictions on eligibility under the Civil Rights Act at 
that first stage of the prima facie case shows how easy it is to intro-
duce castelike distinctions into a law that a few short years before 
had been dedicated to their elimination. From the use of protected 
classes, it is only a short step to the idea of affirmative action,11 
7. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 
(1988)). 
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988). 
9. 411 U.S. 792 (1973), criticized in EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 167-81. 
10. 411 U.S. at 802. 
11. See David A. Strauss, Biology, Difference, and Gender Discrimination, 41 DEPAUL L. 
REv. 1007, 1019 (1992) (agreeing with my analysis that the use of protected classes and af-
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which adds the carrot to the stick and further reinforces the race 
and sex distinctions the statute was designed to eliminate. 
In this essay, therefore, I address the notion of caste in two sep-
arate contexts: in the traditional disputes over race and sex, and in 
the more modem disputes over sexual orientation. In both cases 
the idea of caste and its kindred notions of subordination and hier-
archy are used to justify massive forms of government intervention. 
In all cases I think that these arguments are incorrect. In their 
place, I argue that the idea of caste should be confined to categories 
of formal, or legal, distinctions between persons before the law. 
This more limited notion of caste supplies no justification for the 
enforcement of any civil rights law that purports to limit the free-
dom of association among individuals, whether their connections be 
intimate and personal, economic and professional, or religious and 
social. But by the same token, this limited conception mirrors the 
older conception of civil rights law - a conception that restored to 
individuals the capacity to contract and to form associations of their 
own choosing.12 Judged by that standard, many laws on the books 
today are illegitimate, limiting associational choice between individ-
uals, as laws once did under Jim Crow in the South, or as the pre-
twentieth-century legal disabilities of women did. In particular, the 
current prohibitions against same-sex marriages are themselves a 
mistake - regardless of what one thinks of the wisdom or morality 
of these marriages - and should be rejected as inimical to the basic 
principle of freedom of association on which a liberal society should 
rest. Rightly understood, the idea of caste works best when con-
fined to its original understanding. The effort to expand that con-
ception obscures the critical distinction between removing and 
imposing state barriers to voluntary associations. The older, liberal 
conception of civil rights law thus makes far more sense than its 
modem competition. 
I. RACE AND SEX 
The first effort to expand the notion of caste beyond its formal 
base has been in the area of race relations. It is easy to denounce 
the Jim Crow rules of the old South as the creation of a caste sys-
tem insofar as the system had formal segregation in public schools, 
explicit racial segregation on public transportation, and an explicit 
firmative action are not significantly distinct. but reaching the opposite conclusion - that is, 
that both practices should be preserved). 
12. For a longer discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, 1Wo Conceptions of Civil Rights, 
Soc. PHIL. & POL., Spring 1991, at 38, 
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prohibition on racial intermarriage. Kenneth Karst, a champion of 
the communitarian view, has stated this position well.13 The Court 
upheld these racial restrictions in Plessy v. Ferguson, 14 and it took 
not only Brown v. Board of Education15 but a host of other deci-
sions to root out segregation in American life.16 But the identifica-
tion of these restrictions as abuses need not translate into a need for 
big government. Quite the opposite - the removal of these restric-
tions is perfectly consistent with the program of a limited-state lib-
ertarian, an individualist to the core, who wholeheartedly 
champions the civil rights movement to the extent that it allows all 
persons the equal protection of the common law rules of property, 
contract, and tort, and equal legal rights to vote and otherwise par-
ticipate in public affairs. The first civil rights movement aimed to 
assure the capacity of all persons to enter into voluntary transac-
tions, to hold property, and to sue and be sued,17 and insofar as it 
sought to create capacities and remove legal disabilities, it is an es-
sential part of the liberal and individualist program to the same if 
not greater extent than it is part and parcel of the modern civil 
rights agenda. 
The modern antidiscrimination norm requires each person 
within a group to treat with equal respect all other persons, regard-
less of their race, creed, sex, religion, or national origin. These prin-
ciples are designed not to further the principle of freedom of 
13. See Kenneth Karst, Equality and Community: Lessons from the Civil Rights Era, 56 
NoTRE DAME LAw.183, 200-14 (1980); Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitu-
tion and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REv. 303 (1986) [hereinafter Karst, Paths to Belonging]. 
Karst writes: 
Jim Crow illustrates the main technique of nativist domination: the enforced separa-
tion of members of the subordinate cultural group from a wide range of public and 
private institutions that, in the aggregate, constitute "society." Racial segregation in the 
American South was the successor to slavery and the Black Codes, both of which had 
been decisively made unlawful by congressional legislation and the Civil War amend-
ments. In this historical context it is easy to see Jim Crow for what it was: a thoroughgo-
ing program designed to maintain blacks as a group in the position of a subordinate 
racial caste by means of a systematic denial of belonging. 
Id. at 320-21. 
14. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
15. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
16. See, e.g., Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (municipal airport restau-
rant); New Orleans City Park Improvement Assn. v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (parks); 
Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (buses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 
(1955) (golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (beaches); see also 
Karst, Paths to Belonging, supra note 13, at 323 n.136. 
17. See Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1982 (1988)) (addressing the right to hold property); Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 
Stat. 144 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988)), amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981(a) 
to 1981(c) (Supp. V 1993) (addressing the right to enter into contracts and the right to sue 
and be sued). 
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association but to limit its scope, in effect, by requiring that certain 
characteristics regarded as morally irrelevant by some general the-
ory must be treated as irrelevant by all individuals in their private 
decisions - with the usual sting - whether they like it or not. In 
part this theory seeks to rely on the same set of instincts that led the 
first wave of civil rights reform; it indicates that persons - notably 
blacks and women - who have been treated as inferiors and subor-
dinates in their economic or social status should be accorded the 
special protection of the law.18 
Yet here there is a fatal flaw in the effort to link the formal 
differences in legal status with the economic and social deprivations 
that some groups suffer, or are said to suffer, in society - in effect, 
to make disparate results in gross statistical analyses of economic 
success analogous to caste. We should remember, though, that 
caste is not a synonym for subpopulation. Caste means something 
very specific - that is, a hereditary class structure. Thus my 
Webster's gives as its first definition of caste a narrow one: "one of 
the hereditary social classes in Hinduism."19 The stress on heredi-
tary positions in a caste does not seem to transfer easily to the con-
temporary American environment, in which no formal structures -
except, of course, the civil rights laws - enforce social or economic 
stratification based on inborn characteristics. This is especially true 
in a world of racial intermarriage, and without some very sophisti-
cated translation, the focus on hereditary positions makes no sense 
at all with respect to distinctions between men and women. 
Most importantly, however, castes are formal constructs that tie 
explicit privileges to each discrete status. But there is no lockstep 
connection between group identity and economic position. It is 
possible for a group to be the target of legal discrimination and 
subordination on the one hand and yet to be economically prosper-
ous on the other. That was surely the case in the early years of the 
Nazi regime for the Jews, who were at best second-class citizens, 
and is the lot of many Indians who have left India and have settled 
and worked in various African countries. 
Any concern with economic differentials and disadvantages 
should not blind us to the fact that first and foremost in any caste 
system is the traditional concern with explicit legal differences in 
capacities or entitlements based on the accidents of birth: race, sex, 
18. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 2, at 2428-29. 
19. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 212 (1984). The more general 
definition refers to "a division of society based on differences of wealth, inherited rank or 
privilege, profession, or occupation." Id. 
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religion, and national origin. The effort to find evidence of de facto 
discrimination should not blind us to the obvious point that de jure, 
explicit, and formal discriminations by the state are still the first 
evil, whether or not they produce the economic inequalities with 
which they are often, but not necessarily, associated. It is danger-
ous to pump up economic and social differences by using a word 
that makes them sound like formal legal distinctions imposed by 
operation of law and against the will of the parties so bound and 
disadvantaged. 
As one might expect, the economic data are balky as well. Afri-
can Americans today do not do well by many of the standard meas-
ures of success. The United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) has constructed a human development index, incorporat-
ing three basic elements by which it rates various nations and 
groups within nations: life expectancy at birth, education, and in-
come.20 Under these measures the United States is said to rank 
sixth behind Japan, Canada, Norway, Switzerland, and Sweden,21 
though the differences among these nations are all trivially small, 
with numbers ranging from 0.983 for Japan to 0.976 for the United 
States.22 But the story is quite different when the divisions are 
made by race. On that scale American whites move to first place 
on the list, a small change given the defects in the basic index. But 
American blacks receive a score of 0.875, which would place them 
in thirty-second place on the list of nations, just behind Trinidad 
and Tobago, while American Hispanics - including many recent 
immigrants from Latin America, so the figure is systematically mis-
leading - would rank thirty-fifth, just behind Estonia, with an in-
dex of around 0.87.23 The data should surely give everyone pause. 
20. UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1993, at 10, 
104 {1993) [hereinafter HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT]. The Human Development Index 
(HDI) ranges from 0.983 for Japan to 0.045 for Guinea; HDI scores are computed by sub-
tracting a composite score - referred to as a nation's "average deprivation" - from 1. See 
id. at 135-37, 100-01. 
21. See id. at 135 tbl. 1. 
22. The small differences relate to imperfections in the construction of the index. The 
educational component, for example, takes into account basic literacy, which is at 99% for all 
developed nations; mean years of schooling, which shows only little variation; and a literacy 
index, which likewise is at 1.00 for the first 14 nations on the list. Id. at 100-01. There are 
also only a few years' variation in life expectancy in the developed nations; the figure hovers 
in the mid-70s for males and females born in 1990. Id. The major differences come in the 
income figures, and these are subject to genuine difficulties in conversion in that the varia-
tions in standards of living do not track the higher volatility of exchange rates in a one-for-
one fashion. Id. at 106-07. The rankings at the top are therefore close to arbitrary and the 
bunching effect is evidence, not of the closeness of these nations to each other, but of the 
insensitivity of the variables chosen. 
23. Id. at 18 figs. 1.12 & 1.13. The numbers are approximate, from the graph. It is also 
striking that black females do far better than black men on the scale. The aggregate figures 
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Nonetheless, to draw an inference of caste from this data is to 
ignore the enormous differences in life fortunes and expectations 
among the individuals who fall within any given population - dif-
ferences not discussed in the UNDP report. For its part, however, 
the very notion of a formal caste does not admit of these degrees of 
informal differentiation; all members of the subordinated group are 
forced to ride in the back of the bus, so to speak. The very fact of 
significant variation in social success within groups is itself evidence 
that some process far more complex than caste differentiation is 
involved. There is little doubt that black professional women, for 
example, earn far more than unskilled white male laborers do. 
These distinctions in income within racial groups are largely attribu-
table to the very broad categories of workers who are lumped to-
gether in a single class: the label accountant, for example, covers 
both people who do simple audits and those who structure complex 
financial transactions.24 
But even if we put that point aside, there is no reason to believe 
that differences in economic or personal well-being are solely, or 
even mostly, the result of social forces rather than individual effort. 
In particular, it is wrong to say that any observed differences in 
group achievement levels should be attributed as a matter of course 
to social practices or institutional structures. In some instances the 
differences might well be attributed to personal motivation, family 
structure, hustle, and luck. At some point the consequences of indi-
vidual failure should be laid at the feet of the individual who fails, 
for if they are not, then the incentives for success are effectively 
undermined. An ethic of personal responsibility is not meant solely 
to point the finger at those who fail. Its prime objective is to give 
individuals incentives to succeed so that no fingers need be pointed 
at them after the fact. The willingness to create collective responsi-
bility for individual failure has as its unfortunate consequence an 
increase in the rate of failure. It is not possible to create the right 
incentives for individual achievement by resorting only to carrots 
but never to sticks, and it is not possible to get the right mix of 
incentives by appealing to the idea of pervasive social discrimina-
tion as the source of lower economic and educational achievement 
for some African Americans. Indeed, at least twenty years of ag-
are around 0.90 for females and 0.86 for males, id. fig. 1.13, and these numbers surely under-
state the difference because they give more weight to the greater black male income than is 
appropriate for any overall measure of individual well-being. It is hard to attribute these sex 
differences to any form of racial discrimination. 
24. See VICTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 49-52 (1988) 
(suggesting this analogy in an analysis of the "wage gap" between men and women). 
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gressive enforcement of civil rights laws designed precisely to elimi-
nate such social discrimination and "caste distinctions" has done 
little to redress the worrisome trend in these statistics.25 The 
sources of the current social difficulties cannot be explained by a 
simple appeal to the notion of caste. 
Current social practices are also inconsistent with the idea that 
African Americans are the victims of caste distinctions within this 
country. Indeed, while African Americans are experiencing lower 
levels of success by the standard economic measures, there is at the 
same time a systematic set of programs, both public and private, 
that discriminate in their favor on grounds of race. Many of the 
public programs for affirmative action or diversity introduce ex-
plicit notions of caste by allowing African Americans certain advan-
tages based on race that are denied to others. I am hard pressed to 
identify any real caste system in the history of the world that has 
had affirmative action programs for members of its disadvantaged 
groups. The result is a rare juxtaposition of phenomena: declining 
economic fortunes for African Americans at the same time that 
there is a steady or increasing level of explicit legal advantages. It is 
hard to see how a return to older principles of freedom of associa-
tion and equality of all persons before the law could do much to 
alter the situation for the worse. 
The economic data on caste with respect to women is even more 
suspicious. To look at the UNDP's report, one might think that 
there was a major scandal brewing in the world. When the UNDP 
breaks down its HDI by sex, it comes up with the bald - and false 
- categorical conclusion: "No country treats its women as well as 
it treats its men."26 To support this conclusion it takes the break-
down of its HDI by sex and notes that for the first-place country, 
Sweden, the HDI is 0.977 overall and 0.921 for women, while for 
the United States the comparable drop is from 0.976 to 0.824.27 It 
should be quickly apparent that something is sadly amiss, because 
the index measure states that the position of American women is 
below that of the citizens of, among other countries, Trinidad and 
Tobago and Estonia.28 In fact, the position of the average Ameri-
can woman is just below that of the average citizen of Poland and 
25. See James J. Heckman & J. Hoult Verkerke, Racial Disparity and Employment Dis-
crimination Law: An Economic Perspective, 8 YALE L. & PoLY. REv. 276, 276 (1990) 
("[S]ince 1975, relative black economic status has not advanced and may have deteriorated 
slightly."). 
26. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 20, at 16 fig. 1.19. 
27. Id. tbl. 1.3. 
28. Id. at 135 tbl. 1. 
2466 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 92:2456 
Georgia, both long under communist rule.29 Because the women in 
these countries are clearly less well-off than the men, it seems that 
the American woman is far worse off than the men of Romania and 
Albania, although these numbers are mercifully not included in the 
report. 
Clearly there is something bizarre about this rank order, and it 
is easy to see what it is. The UNDP report uses, ironically, a male-
centered analytical methodology: to the extent that women match 
up statistically "like men," the report sees them as successful. Yet 
the report makes no effort to recognize the economic contributions 
made disproportionately by women - contributions that are not 
contained in its limited data set. While the UNDP report insists 
that the lives of human beings are what is really at stake,30 its treat-
ment of sex differences makes a mockery of that claim. Thus, in 
looking at the breakdown by sex, it is clear that women outlive men 
- and the disparity is greater for blacks than it is for whites31 -
and that female levels of literacy are higher as well. The UNDP 
gives all females in the United States a rating of 103.0% in life ex-
pectancy - with 100% representing parity with men - and 
101.6% in educational attainment.32 All the negative data then 
come from the economic indicators on adjusted gross domestic 
product, whereon American women rate at 48.7 relative to men's 
100.33 Surely a moment's reflection shows that something is deeply 
amiss. How can American women achieve at least parity on life 
expectation and education if they have only half the income of 
men? 
What is missing in the report is any notion that family units en-
gage in cooperative production and distribution, whereby women 
invest more of their time in work in the home, for which they do 
not receive any cash payment from a third-party source. This work 
generates enormous amounts of imputed income, which the women 
share with their husbands and families, just as husbands share their 
market-based wealth with their wives and their families. There is a 
pooling of income and gains from trade. A similar story has to be 
told when the inquiry turns from wages to income from stocks and 
29. Id. 
30. See id. at iii. 
31. See id. at 18 fig. 1.13. White American females have a life expectancy of somewhat 
over 77 years, and for white American men, the figure is 75. For black females the life expec-
tancy is somewhat over 72 years of age, and for black men, somewhat less than 69. Id. 
32. Id. at 101 tbl. 1.1. 
33. See id. 
August 1994] From Jim Crow to Same-Sex Marriages 2467 
bonds. I have not done any close work on the subject, but informa-
tion supplied by the New York Stock Exchange suggests that the 
average male has a portfolio of about $13,500 in stock, while the 
average female has a portfolio of little more than half that size, or 
$7,200.34 But once again the raw data cry out for correction, for the 
key question for social welfare is not who receives the dividend 
checks but who spends the proceeds and to what ends. The same 
kind of informal redistribution with the immediate - and extended 
- family that happens all the time with earned income happens 
with investment income as well: there are massive amounts of re-
distribution within families that are not caught by the official ex-
change statistics. The problems, moreover, are complicated still 
further by the complex patterns of survivorship rights that are ap-
plicable to substantial assets that are placed in pension or private 
trusts. There are more widows than widowers in the United States, 
and spousal protection usually ranks higher than the passage of 
wealth onto the next generation in the eyes of most decedents. I 
am in no position to conduct the detailed empirical study that is 
necessary to determine the actual divisions and effective control of 
wealth by sex in our society. But the educational and life expec-
tancy figures surely provide some clue that this redistribution is 
substantial, for it is difficult to understand how women could do so 
well as a group by these output measures if they had so few inputs 
to work with. 
Unfortunately, the UNDP report makes no effort to capture any 
of these effects, and every effort to ignore them, when it blandly 
concludes as follows: "In industrial countries, gender discrimina-
tion (measured by the HD!) is mainly in employment and wages, 
with women often getting less than two-thirds of the employment 
opportunities and about half the earnings of men."35 Even within 
the paid sector, there is no effort to make adjustments to take into 
account years of specialized education, years of experience, or 
hours committed to the workplace. To give some idea of how mis-
guided the UNDP figures are, the better studies on comparable 
worth indicate that male-female differences when job classifications 
are held constant are, at a maximum, ten to fifteen percent, and 
even that gap disappears when marital status is taken into ac-
34. NYSE SHAREOWNERSHIP 14-15 (1990). Information provided by Bethann Ashfield, 
New York Stock Exchange Library. 
35. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 20, at 16-17. 
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count:36 "Women who have never married have historically re-
ceived wages roughly comparable to men's."37 
The UNDP conclusions on the differential status of men and 
women are, then, worse than worthless. They are positively mis-
leading and downright mischievous. Moreover, for our mundane 
purposes they do not advance the idea that women are a 
subordinated caste by so much as a millimeter. Overall, there is 
little mileage in the idea of using caste as a way to get at the social 
and economic differences that are found among members of a soci-
ety. Likewise, I think that there is little to be gained by seeking to 
use the idea of caste to justify an antidiscrimination law that is 
designed, not to eliminate formal barriers to association and ex-
change, but to override in its very conception the freedom of associ-
ation that should lie at the heart of any rational liberal order. 
II. DISCRIMINATION AND SEXUAL PREFERENCE 
The most vivid illustration of the arguments about caste arise in 
the context of sexual preferences. At present there is a good deal 
of litigation and dispute over the legal rights of gays and lesbians in 
the United States. At one level the demands are for associational 
freedom - that is, for the state to recognize and enforce same-sex 
marriages on the same terms and conditions on which it recognizes 
and enforces marriages between men and women. Here the con-
cern is parallel to the formal restrictions on interracial marriages. It 
is therefore quite proper to argue that these formal restrictions at 
least raise the specter of caste differences between persons. But at 
the same time there is an equal concern about extending the protec-
tion of the antidiscrimination norm in employment and housing, for 
example, to gays and lesbians. In essence, the effort to remove for-
mal barriers to gays and lesbians is accompanied by an attack on 
the informal barriers as well. 
The bundling of these two programs in the same package cre-
ates all sorts of tensions that are nicely brought to bear in the ex-
traordinary judicial proceedings that have taken place in Colorado 
over its recent popular constitutional referendum - Amendment 
238 - preventing state and local governments from enacting an-
tidiscrimination laws that would treat gays, lesbians, and bisexuals 
36. See, e.g., ELLEN F. PAUL, Eou1TY AND GENDER: THE COMPARABLE WoRrn 
DEBATE 16 (1989). She relies on studies by Paul Weiler. See Paul Weiler, The Wages of Sex: 
The Uses and Limits of Comparable Worth, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1728, 1784 (1986). 
37. PAUL, supra note 36, at 17; see also Weiler, supra note 36, at 1785. 
38. CoLO. CoNST. art. II, § 30b. 
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as classes protected from discrimination in employment and hous-
ing, or indeed from any form of discrimination.39 The Colorado 
Supreme Court recently struck down Amendment 2 on the grounds 
that the state had not shown a compelling state interest to justify 
the amendment's infringement on the right of those affected by the 
provision to participate equally in the political process.4o 
In one sense, the decision invalidating Amendment 2 bears 
some resemblance to one of the most important and controversial 
decisions of the Warren Court, Reitman v. Mulkey.41 At issue in 
that case was an amendment to the California Constitution passed 
by referendum. The amendment provided: . 
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, 
limit or abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is 
willing or who desire to sell, lease or rent any part of all of his real 
property, to decline to sell, lease or rent such property to such person 
or persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses.42 
The provision did not apply to real estate owned by the state. 
In Reitman, the Court struck down the provision on the grounds 
that by incorporating the provision into its constitution, the state 
"authorized" the forms of discrimination that had previously been 
prohibited under the Unruh and Rumford Acts,43 which were nec-
essarily overridden by the new constitutional provision.44 As is typ-
ical in dubious constitutional decisions, the Court refused to find 
that any dispositive test existed to demarcate state action from pri-
vate action and instead announced that all depends on "sifting facts 
39. The provision reads: 
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation. Neither 
the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its agen-
cies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce 
any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual 
orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis 
of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota 
preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution 
shall be in all respects self-executing. 
COLO. CoNST. art. II, § 30b. The amendment clearly attacks bans on private discrimination 
and appears to reach discrimination by the state as well. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 
1284-85 & n.25 (Colo.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993). 
40. Evans v. Romer, Nos. 94SA48, 94SA128, 1994 Colo. LEXIS 779 (Oct. 11, 1994). The 
court initially held that the amendment should receive strict scrutiny in Evans v. Romer, 854 
P.2d 1270 (Colo)., cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993). 
41. 387 U.S. 369 (1967). 
42. CAL. CONST. art. I,§ 26 (enacted 1964, repealed 1974) (enacting Proposition 14). 
43. Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL. C1v. CODE § 51 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994); Rumford 
Fair Housing Act, CAL. C1v. CODE§ 35720 (West 1973), repealed by Act of Sept. 19, 1980, ch. 
992, 1980 Cal. Stat. 3166 (codified at CAL. GoVT. CoDE § 12955 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994)). 
44. 387 U.S. at 376-77. 
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and weighing circumstances."45 But surely this idea of state author-
ization is extended so far as to be useless for making any decision. 
Authorization normally connotes a situation in which one person 
authorizes another to act on his behalf, so that the acts of the agent 
are then sufficient to bind the principal. Yet this provision properly 
exempted state property from its scope.46 Moreover, even if the 
state authorizes the autonomous acts of its own citizens through this 
provision, which acts does it authorize - only those that involve 
racial discrimination against preferred classes? Or those that dis-
criminate in their favor? Or those decisions that purport to follow a 
color-blind policy in selling or leasing? These policies are all dia-
metrically at odds with one another, and it is far more accurate to 
insist that the state authorizes none of them than to pretend that it 
authorizes them all. The decisions to exclude or include are made 
by the individuals in question. They are only enforced by the state, 
which does not take a position as to their intrinsic desirability, any 
more than it does when it solemnizes a marriage between two per-
sons of the same race, neither of whom would on principle marry a 
person of a different race. In my view, the initial provisions of the 
Unruh and Rumford Acts should have been struck down as illicit 
forms of state action that interfere with the liberty and property 
rights of individuals, so that the corrective referendum should not 
have been needed at all. But, as it was, Reitman followed the line 
set originally by Shelley v. Kraemer47 and Barrows v. Jackson48 and 
sought to obliterate the public-private distinction under a clause 
that aimed to constitutionalize it.49 
This constitutional tradition makes it difficult to think about the 
wisdom of Amendment 2. In principle, the background rules 
against which the soundness of the amendment is evaluated are crit-
ical to the inquiry. As I have argued, the proper background condi-
tion is one that allows all private individuals to choose the persons 
with whom they wish to associate and deal. To say, therefore, that 
any person can refuse to deal with gays or lesbians is not to say very 
much at all. All individuals also have the right to refuse to deal 
with heterosexuals or indeed any other subclass of the general pop-
45. 387 U.S. at 378 (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 
(1961)). 
46. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 26 (repealed 1974). It also excludes innkeepers, who were at 
common law subject to an antidiscrimination provision. 
47. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
48. 346 U.S. 249 (1953). 
49. For my criticism of the Shelley line of cases, see Epstein, Standing Firm, supra note 4, 
at 29-33. 
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ulation. On this view, therefore, the amendment is quite simply un-
necessary as it only confirms a set of rights that are already 
universally held. 
That simple approach will not do, however, in a world in which 
the antidiscrimination norm is regarded as superior to the principle 
of freedom of association. If the law now says that one cannot dis-
criminate on the grounds of race, ethnic origin, sex, age, religion, or 
disability, then why should it single out sexual orientation as an 
area in which the ancient principle of freedom of association is al-
lowed full sway against its two traditional antagonists: criminaliza-
tion of the relationship and the antidiscrimination ordinance? 
Viewed in this context, the very passage of the referendum could be 
viewed as an effort to impose second-class citizenship on some per-
sons for the benefit of others. Indeed, it was just this argument that 
led the Colorado Supreme Court to insist that the amendment be 
subjected to strict scrutiny,50 even after Bowers v. Hardwick51 ap-
parently closed the door on any ordinary strict scrutiny attack on 
equal protection grounds.52 Thus the Colorado decisions stress that 
what is at stake is not gay and lesbian relations as such but their 
connection to participation in the political process: 
Amendment 2 singles out that class of persons (namely gay men, les-
bians, and bisexuals) who would benefit from laws barring discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation. No other identifiable group 
faces such a burden - no other group's ability to participate in the 
political process is restricted and encumbered in a like manner .... 
In short, gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals are left out of the polit-
ical process through the denial of having an "effective voice in the 
governmental affairs which substantially affect their lives." Strict 
scrutiny is thus required because the normal political processes no 
longer operate to protect these persons. Rather, they, and they alone, 
must amend the state constitution in order to seek legislation which is 
beneficial to them.53 
By this standard the amendment is surely dead on arrival. But the 
question is why this standard should be applied at all. If Amend-
ment 2 were confined to private parties alone, then in a world of 
freedom of association, the amendment would be redundant and 
unnecessary and the singling-out argument raised in the opinion 
50. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1282 (Colo.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993). 
51. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
52. See 478 U.S. at 190. 
53. 854 P.2d at 1285 (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1963)); see also 
Evans v. Romer, Nos. 94SA48, 94SA128, 1994 Colo. LEXIS 779, at *5, *10 (Oct. 11, 1994). 
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would fail.S4 Precisely because association rights are accorded such 
low status, the defenders of this amendment, at least as it is applied 
to private parties, are now put to a cruel choice. In order to defend 
part of the turf of freedom of association, they have to make it ap-
pear as though they harbor special animus against the groups that 
want to claim the protection of the antidiscrimination ordinance. It 
is no longer possible to argue simply that people should be able to 
choose to associate with some individuals but not with others with-
out giving learned reasons for their choice. Instead, proponents of 
the amendment must give long and elaborate explanations as to 
why some groups are unworthy, by some public standard, of a guar-
antee of the same level of protection that is accorded to other 
groups. The net effect, therefore, is to invite both testimony and 
rebuttal on the issue of whether homosexual conduct is or is not 
immoral or whether it is or is not against the public interest. More-
over, it is to do so, not in open public debate, but in the context of 
expert testimony in a courtroom setting - hardly the place to have 
a sensible debate over any sensitive social issue.ss The inability to 
rely on freedom of association means that all refusals to associate 
have to be for cause, so that individuals and groups who wish to be 
left alone now have to engage in the unhappy task of group defama-
tion in order to achieve that rather simple end. The upshot is that 
the entire process sanctions a level of antigay and antilesbian rheto-
ric that is better left unspoken in public settings. 
Importing rhetoric of this sort into the political process can 
hardly do anything to build the strong sense of mutual respect on 
which political communities are supposed to rest. Indeed, there is 
reason to believe that it can only make matters far worse. The 
S4. For what it is worth, this argument also seems wrong for another reason. All sorts of 
people who are neither gay, lesbian, nor bisexual could, and did, oppose the amendment. 
The disabilities created in the amendment are directed to one class, but the limitations on 
participation in the political process are not. 
SS. For excerpts of this courtroom debate, see the testimony by John Finnis and Martha 
Nussbaum, first for and then against the amendment. John Finnis & Martha Nussbaum, ls 
Homosexual Conduct Wrong? A Philosophical Exchange, NEw REPUBLIC, Nov. lS, 1993, 
at 12. I venture no opinion on the accuracy of classical references, but Finnis's testimony 
surely is fatal to his own cause insofar as it equates homosexual conduct with "all extramari-
tal sexual gratification." Id. (citing Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, Musonius, Rufus, and 
Plutarch). Finnis just misunderstands the situation if he even thinks that the people who 
supported Amendment 2 would extend it to unmarried couples living together, or even to 
casual heterosexual contact. His condemnation of sex outside marriage sweeps far too 
broadly for the occasion. In any event, this testimony is odd indeed because what is at stake 
is an antidiscrimination ordinance that could be in place even after homosexual conduct is 
decriminalized. Moreover, his argument that homoerotic culture should be discouraged be-
cause it is incompatible with true friendship, id., is an observation that does not need the 
force of law behind it, even if it is true. 
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traditional position of individualism has a great virtue insofar as it 
does not link freedom of association to the endorsement of the 
modem antidiscrimination principle of the civil rights laws. Today 
it is too often assumed that the proposition that A has the right to 
do X carries with it two distinct implications: first, that no one can 
punish or sue A for having done X, and second, that no one can 
discriminate against A in personal or business dealings for having 
done X. For example, once we decide that people cannot be pun-
ished because they have once used drugs, then we have necessarily 
decided that private employers and landlords cannot discriminate 
against people for just these same reasons. Similarly, once we have 
decided that homosexual conduct is not criminal, then we are nec-
essarily committed to the proposition that employers and landlords 
cannot discriminate against gays and lesbians in their private affairs; 
nor, for that matter, can employers and landlords discriminate in 
their favor. 
The connection here is unfortunate because, among other 
things, it encourages resistance to the first step - legalization and 
recognition - because of the fear that the second step - forced 
association - will follow. For example, the question of the legality 
of same-sex marriages has bullied its way to the front of the consti-
tutional agenda.56 The arguments in favor of their legalization are 
strong as a matter of political theory. The principle of freedom of 
association is no weaker on matters of intimate association than it is 
on matters of business association, and it may be stronger in the 
sense that it can resist regulation even with compensation. But for 
our purposes, the key point is that outsiders cannot point to their 
own distaste for the practices, or to their strong religious convic-
tions and objections, as public reasons to render these unions un-
lawful. Surely the principle of offense cannot be used to prevent 
gay and lesbian couples from normalizing their relationships by 
56. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 {Haw. 1993) {holding that a strict scrutiny standard 
must be applied to determine whether the state prohibition against same-sex marriages 
should stand). On this same question, see Jennifer L. Heeb, Comment, Homosexual Mar-
riage, the Changing American Family, and the Heterosexual Right to Privacy, 24 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 347 (1993) (urging that the due process guarantees of privacy to different-sex couples 
apply to same-sex couples as well). See also William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex 
Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419 (1993); Jennifer G. Brown, Competitive Federalism and the 
Legislative Incentives to Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. (forthcoming Mar. 
1995) (arguing that competitive pressures for the business of these couples and their support-
ers will induce some states to break ranks and introduce these marriages, which then must be 
recognized by other states under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution, U.S . 
. CoNST. art. IV, § 1). 
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contract.57 Once same-sex couples are allowed to use ordinary con-
tractual devices to help keep their relationships on an even keel, it 
is hard to see why the state should be able to deny them the oppor-
tunity to introduce into their relationships the same level of perma-
nence and stability that state sanctions give to marriages between 
couples of different sexes. It follows that these married couples 
should be allowed to participate on equal footing with other 
couples in the benefits that the state confers on marriages: pre-
ferred status under immigration laws,58 with guardianship arrange-
ments,59 under rent control laws,60 and in the area of inheritance.6t 
This last set of demands cannot, I believe, be opposed on the 
ground that it is one thing for the state to suppress an arrangement 
and quite another to require the state to place its stamp of approval 
on the full arrangement, which is what legal recognition seems to 
demand.62 That question of conferring benefits means far less in 
the state context given the state monopoly power over the relevant 
set of licenses, so that the key question - at least for the support-
ers of a liberal state - is whether the state skews private prefer-
ences among various forms of associational freedom, which it surely 
does when it gives one kind of sexual union a preferred position 
that is systematically denied to another. The liberal and individual-
istic argument for same-sex marriages is thus quite powerful and is 
similar to the argument against the barriers to marriages between 
different races, which were removed when the Supreme Court de-
57. Often gay and lesbian couples have entered into contracts that spell out the division 
of financial and personal responsibility and that require each partner to bear some responsi-
bility for the welfare of the other. Understandings of that sort are usually a prerequisite for 
treating the arrangement as "permanent" enough to qualify for the same types of benefits as 
married couples receive. See Brown, supra note 56, for a list of local governments that award 
same-sex benefit packages. Many private institutions, including the University of Chicago, 
have same-sex benefit packages, as do many businesses, including Apple Computer. 
58. For an example of the limitations placed on same-sex partners in the context of immi-
gration, see Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119 {1980) (disallowing "immediate relative" 
status to an Australian citizen in a same-sex union with an American citizen). 
59. For an example of this benefit as extended to same-sex partners, see In re Guardian-
ship of Sharon Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (allowing a same-sex partner 
to be appointed guardian over the objections of the ward's parents). 
60. For an example of the extension of this privileged status to same-sex partners, see 
Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989) (allowing a gay partner to "inherit" a 
rent-controlled apartment under a statute that permitted these rights to descend to members 
of the decedent's "family"). One blissful way to avoid this problem would be to abolish rent 
control, but only if it were abolished for all couples. 
61. For an application of this principle in the same-sex context, see In re Estate of 
Cooper, 564 N.Y.S.2d 684 (Sup. Ct. 1990), affd. sub nom. In re Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 
(App. Div. 1993) (disallowing a current partner's rights to inherit as a surviving spouse). 
62. See Earl M. Maltz, Constitutional Protection for the Right to Marry: A Dissenting 
View, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 949, 955 (1992). 
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clared antimiscegenation laws .uncc;mstitutional.63 It should hardly 
matter that there are lots of people who are deeply offended by 
either kind of union or who regard them as violating every sacred 
religious belief. They are not asked to participate in these unions, 
and under the liberal theory they could not be required to enter any 
associations whatsoever with people who choose to enter into them. 
The challenge here is whether the case for homosexual rights 
and same-sex marriages should leap two chasms with a single 
bound. First, the associational freedom would be preserved and 
given the same level of protection ·as other unions. But then the 
usual protections of antidiscrimination laws would be imposed so 
that persons in such relationships could not be the subject of dis-
crimination in employment or housing. If that second step would 
necessarily be taken, then suddenly there is a good reason to keep 
homosexual relations illegal if the alternative is that a religious fun-
damentalist would have to lease an upstairs apartment to a gay 
couple once their conduct is decriminalized or their marriage 
solemnized. 
It is, in my view, a far better world if the owner can keep and act 
on his own religious and moral scruples on this issue, even if 
learned academics and legislators are quite capable of proving that 
his conclusions do not rest on any rational principles that are capa-
ble of articulation to nonbelievers. Religious ·and moral scruples 
should never limit the freedom of association of gays and lesbians: 
religious folks are not spared from having to tolerate offensive be-
havior any more than the remainder of the population is, and if 
they have to put up with enforceable same-sex contracts short of 
marriage and with the private recognition of these contracts,64 then 
they have to accept the marriages as well. But by the same token, 
these individuals should be entitled to rely on their own religious 
and moral convictions, however flawed and imperfect others might 
believe them to be, in ordering and organizing their own affairs. No 
principle of community values should encourage either group to be 
so confident in the soundness of its own moral precepts that it is 
prepared to force them down the throats of those unfortunate and 
uneducated enough to disagree with them. All sides should be enti-
tled to the defensive use of their own beliefs under a principle of 
free association. There is no reason to lurch from a world in which 
63. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
64. See supra note 57. 
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too little prote'ction is conferred to homosexual individuals and 
couples to a world in which they receive too much protection. 
CONCLUSION 
I think that some important social lessons can be learned from 
the recent flirtation with caste as the generative principle behind 
the antidiscrimination laws. The chief point concerns the relation-
ship between legal prohibitions and social distinctions. It has long 
been fashionable in legal and policy debates to decry the distinction 
between de jure and de facto, between formal legal differences and 
social imbalances. That popular attack, however, has its greatest 
appeal after the legal barriers to associational freedom and political 
participation are removed, not before. A sad realization often fol-
lows the removal of these barriers - the realization that social 
cures are not quickly or easily achieved if only because differences 
in living standards, occupational choices, cultural values, social sta-
tus, and lifestyle survive the removal of legal barriers, and that 
these differences prove more difficult to eradicate, even if their 
eradication is desirable. But the situation looks markedly different 
while the legal disabilities are still in place, for then it becomes 
quite coherent, if not attractive, to assert that all that is asked for is 
the removal of legal barriers to participation in various forms of 
social and political life. Think of what we will no longer have: no 
huge social programs that require massive tax increases or intrusive 
regulatory schemes; no political gerrymandering; no special privi-
leges; no social campaigns to decide which individuals or groups are 
victims of past discrimination, which are the perpetrators of that 
discrimination, and which are innocent bystanders caught in the 
crossfire between warring political factions. The program seems to 
promise great gains at little cost. It can be easily endorsed with 
little more than simple justice as its guide. 
The completed campaign for the abolition of Jim Crow and the 
upcoming campaign for the recognition of same-sex marriages both 
fall into this tradition. But they are in some ways very odd compan-
ions. Jim Crow is a legacy of slavery and domination that worked 
havoc on the lives and fortunes of a group of individuals who were 
excluded from formal participation in the political process. With 
same-sex marriages, the prohibitions and restrictions are directed at 
individuals who are often highly trained and successful, with good 
economic prospects, a loud - if minority - voice in the political 
process, and - paradoxically - a protected-class status under 
some antidiscrimination laws. The demographics and positions of 
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the two groups could hardly . be more different, and it is doubtful 
that any political alliance between them could be more than a 
short-term convenience given these differences in social positions 
and personal aspirations. Yet it is precisely because each group in 
its own time targets legal disabilities that they can make a common 
appeal. A good libertarian who believes that all persons have equal 
capacity to make the associational choices that govern their own 
lives has to support these campaigns. It hardly matters whether he 
or she has any sympathy with the ends and aspirations of the indi-
viduals who are denied the ordinary incidents of full citizenship. 
Once the legal disabilities have been removed, then we see the 
emergence of an effort to analogize v~rious economic and social 
differences to the formal legal differences captured in the idea of 
caste. It is just at this juncture that the modern civil rights move-
ment makes its greatest blunders. The economic data in question 
are often impossible to interpret, or are interpreted, if not misinter-
preted, with an eye to magnify differences that either do not exist or 
can be explained, at least in part, by differences in education, train-
ing, aptitudes, or inclinations. Even when some unjustified differ-
ences continue to persist, it is hard to identify them or to know 
exactly what steps should be taken to counteract them. The con-
stant refrain has been that irrational prejudice drives the key behav-
iors in employment and housing, so that all that need be done is to 
make irrational behavior illegal. Would that it were so simple! The 
number of cases of pure irrationality that leap out in practice is 
small, especially in relation to the overall size of the social tensions 
and conflicts. Reforms that are loudly trumpeted when passed are 
utterly incapable of delivering on their oversized promises. The net 
effect of an antidiscrimination law, therefore, is to introduce greater 
cost and uncertainty into the process, to provoke evasive responses 
by firms that fear entrapment by the law, and to create resentments 
on the part of those who fear that the law has done too much or too 
little to redress the perceived level of social imbalance. In a word, 
the size of the pie shrinks while its distribution is scarcely improved. 
These effects are, in my view, an inescapable consequence of 
any philosophical outlook that conflates social and economic differ-
ences with formal legal barriers. What is needed, therefore, is a 
sharp reversal of intellectual orientation. It is critical to defend the 
freedom of association of all individuals. It is equally critical to 
decouple the two fundamentally different questions that today are 
lumped under the single banner of civil rights: civil capacity and 
discrimination. Governments should concentrate on the protection 
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of the former and abandon pursuit of the latter. In a society as 
diverse as our own, any effort to impose a single standard of social 
correctness on associational choice is bound to lead to endless 
struggles over its proper articulation. It is a far better solution to 
allow individuals to go their separate ways, secure in the knowledge 
that they have the protection of the law behind them in pursuit of 
their associational freedoms. That was the original message of civil 
rights law, and that should be the message of the civil rights move-
ment today. 
